The case for a 21st-century battleship by Babones, Salvatore
01/07/2018 The case for a 21st-century battleship | Salvatore Babones
https://salvatorebabones.com/the-case-for-a-21st-century-battleship/ 1/3
In World War II, the Japanese super-battleships Yamato and Musahi each
mounted nine 18.1-inch guns, the largest naval guns ever deployed, but
they never sank a single American ship. In a conﬂict decided by naval
aviation, Yamato and Musahi were used mainly as ﬂagships and troop
transports. Despite their huge armaments, they were steel dinosaurs from
an earlier strategic age.
But how do you sink a steel dinosaur? The answer is: “with di culty.” It
took eleven torpedoes and six bombs to sink the Yamato. The Musahi took
nineteen torpedoes and seventeen bombs. And at the time they were sunk,
both ships were already limping along on patch-up repairs from earlier
torpedo strikes. They may have been strategically useless, but the Yamato
and Musahi were almost (if not quite) indestructible.
Naval construction requires decades of advance planning, and naval
planners are always at risk of ﬁghting the last war. Since the end of World
War II, U.S. naval planning has revolved around the aircraft carrier. But
world wars are few and far between, and other missions abound. When it
comes to countering the rise of China, some of the most frequent missions
are freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) requiring no ﬁghting at all.
Over the last several years China has become increasingly aggressive in
asserting illegal maritime claims in the South China Sea. In response, the
United States regularly conducts FONOPs, sailing destroyers within twelve
nautical miles of China’s artiﬁcial islands to repudiate Beijing’s claims to
sovereign territorial waters. So far, China has been sensible enough not to
challenge any of these operations.
But a destroyer is a fragile ﬁsh. In June last year the USS Fitzgerald was put
out of action by a collision with a container ship, with the loss of seven
lives—on the destroyer. Then in August the USS John S. McCain was nearly
sunk by an oil tanker. Ten sailors lost their lives. The tanker su ered no
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injuries. Leaving aside the issue of poor seamanship, these two collisions
illustrated a potentially more serious shortcoming of today’s naval ships:
poor survivability. Navy ships used to threaten oil tankers, not the other
way around.
The U.S. Navy certainly needs the ﬁrepower provided by its awesome carrier
strike groups and its ﬂimsy, but nonetheless formidable, guided missile
destroyers. But it also needs ships that can take a punch and keep on
sailing. That kind of toughness is likely to become an even more important
quality as China develops its precision strike capacities. Soon it may become
too dangerous to sail an unarmored ship in the South China Sea.
Stealth is one way to keep from getting hit, and the United States leads the
way in the development of stealthy destroyers. But stealth defeats the
purpose of a FONOP, which is to be seen. An old-fashioned battleship is a
ship to be seen—and in a big way. But there’s no need for the Navy to build
an old-fashioned battleship in the twenty-ﬁrst century when it can build a
new-fashioned battleship instead.
A contemporary battleship would combine advanced armor materials with
automated damage control to produce a ship that is virtually unsinkable. Its
o ensive armaments might be mission-speciﬁc, but its key attribute would
be survivability. It would be a ship that could be put in harm’s way in the
reasonable expectation of coming home in one piece.
This “battleship of the future” could solve the challenge posed by China’s
emerging anti-access / area denial (A2/AD) strategy for excluding the
United States from the western Paciﬁc. China is rapidly expanding and
improving its networks of onshore, o shore, undersea, and space-based
sensors to the extent that it will soon be able to see everything that moves
between the Chinese mainland and the ﬁrst island chain formed by Japan,
Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines. And improvements in precision
weaponry will increasingly mean that China will be able to hit anything it
can see.
America’s response has been a shifting set of tactical plans successively
labeled as AirSea Battle, JAM-GC and Third O set. What these plans all
have in common is the idea that the best defense is a good o ense: instead
of defending against Chinese A2/AD attacks, they propose that the United
States strike ﬁrst to take out the command-and-control networks that tie
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China’s sensors to its precision munitions. The problem is that this implies
the immediate escalation of any A2/AD scenario into a full-scale war.
That’s where the battleship of the future comes in: it would give the United
States a defensive option for limited conﬂict. For example, a future
battleship could respond to Chinese provocations by disabling Chinese
seabed sensors or cutting Chinese undersea cables. It could survive being
rammed by enemy ships—a favorite tactic of the Chinese and North
Koreans. And if A2/AD did escalate into a shooting war, it could operate in
the danger zone while U.S. o ensive actions turned the tables.
The U.S. Navy will never again be a dreadnought ﬂeet of big-gun
battleships. But it is time to reexamine the role of armor in naval
architecture. Even the most forward-leaning o ensive operation needs a
few tough linesmen who can take a beating and stay in the game. A future
battleship would give the Navy— and by extension the president—
warﬁghting options other than the total annihilation of the enemy. Regular
FONOPs already demonstrate the need for such options. The A2/AD threat
will likely generate even more dangerous missions that only a durable
battleship of the future can safely perform
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